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PROTECTING INDIA’S SLUM 
DWELLERS: RAJIV AWAS YOJANA’S 
SLUM-FREE CITIES PROGRAM AND 
THE SEVENTY-FOURTH 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ACT 
INTRODUCTION 
ndia’s population is becoming increasingly urbanized.1 Ac-
cording to data from the 2001 census, nearly one third of 
India’s population is living in urban areas,2 and by 2021 that 
percentage is expected to grow to roughly 40% of India’s total 
population.3 The central government of India, in an effort to 
create economically productive and sustainable cities, has tak-
en steps over the last several decades to facilitate economic de-
velopment and improve the provision of public services in cit-
ies, with a particular focus on developing affordable housing 
units and public infrastructure.4 
																																																																																																																												
 1. See MINISTRY OF HOUS. & URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION, NATIONAL 
URBAN HOUSING AND HABITAT POLICY 3 (2007) (India) [hereinafter HOUSING 
AND HABITAT POLICY], 
http://mhupa.gov.in/policies/duepa/HousingPolicy2007.pdf. India’s central 
government defines urban as “a human settlement with a minimum popula-
tion of 5,000 persons, with 75% of the male working population engaged in 
non-agricultural activities and a population density of at least 400 persons 
per sq. km.” Id. Further, all statutory towns having a Municipal Corporation, 
Municipal Council, or Nagar Panchayat, as well as a Cantonment Board, are 
classified as urban. Id. 
 2. See id. Most of India’s growth is concentrated in its largest cities, with 
68.7% of India’s total population living in Class 1 cities (populations in excess 
of 100,000). Id. 
 3. MINISTRY OF URBAN EMPLOYMENT & POVERTY ALLEVIATION, JAWAHARAL 
NEHRU NATIONAL URBAN RENEWAL MISSION: OVERVIEW 3 (2005) (India) [here-
inafter JNNURM OVERVIEW], http://jnnurm.nic.in/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/UIGOverview.pdf; see also HOUSING AND HABITAT 
POLICY, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining that India’s urban population growth 
has been a steady phenomenon, with growth rates between 2.7% and 3.8% in 
the five decades leading up to 2001). 
 4. See HOUSING AND HABITAT POLICY, supra note 1, at 3. India’s Ministry 
of Housing & Urban Poverty Alleviation has stressed the importance of hous-
ing affordability in cities, since nearly one third of India’s low-income popula-
tion resides in cities (representing about 80.7 million people). Id. The Minis-
try has set an “Affordable Housing to All” agenda, which is focused on the 
“Economically Weaker Sections (EWS)” and “Low Income Groups (LIG)” sec-
I
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The decentralization of urban governance is among the policy 
objectives that are consistently present in India’s major urban 
redevelopment programs.5 Decentralization involves the dele-
gation of designated civic responsibilities to localities and, more 
specifically, to the community members themselves, as they are 
“the best judges of their needs.”6 One rationale underlying In-
dia’s decentralization efforts is that community participation in 
government decision making, particularly among politically 
disenfranchised groups, will lead to a more equitable distribu-
tion of urban infrastructure and more efficient delivery of ser-
vices.7 
India’s decentralization process was embodied in law in 1993 
with the passage of the Seventy-Fourth Constitutional 
																																																																																																																												
tors. Id.; see also JNNURM OVERVIEW, supra note 3, at 3 (documenting the 
need for reform initiatives to facilitate investment in basic urban infrastruc-
ture and services). 
 5. See MINISTRY OF HOUS. & URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION, RAJIV AWQAS 
YOJANA (RAY), DRAFT GUIDELINES ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 3 (2011) (In-
dia) [hereinafter RAY GUIDELINES ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION], available at 
http://119.226.159.173/downloads/RAY/Guidelines_Community_Participation
_June.pdf. A central government review of JnNURM revealed that to “ensure 
the sustainability of urban transformation,” ULBs must be a part of the im-
plementation of economic development programs. Id. 
 6. Deepak Sharma, An Evaluation of 74th Constitutional Amendment 
Act: A Case Study of Chandigarh, India, 6 J. ADMIN. & GOVERNANCE 83, 89 
(2011); see Terry Macdonald, GLOBAL STAKEHOLDER DEMOCRACY: POWER AND 
REPRESENTATION BEYOND LIBERAL STATES 40 (2008) (arguing that democratic 
institutions need to move away from a “‘closed’ constitutional structure,” to a 
more decentralized system of “stakeholder communities” with “participatory 
entitlements”). Stakeholders are identified based on their relationship to pub-
lic power: “It is the communities of individuals whose autonomous entitle-
ments are affected by the exercise of [public] power that should be identified 
as the legitimate agents of democratic control, with respect to the particular 
political actors that wield this public power.” Id.; see also Clayton P. Gillette, 
In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory Justify Local 
Government Law, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 995–98 (1991) (explaining that 
localities are more likely to be responsive to the preferences of local residents 
than the state legislature). 
 7. See John Harriss, “Participation” and Contestation in the Governance 
of India Cities, 5 (Simons Papers in Sec. & Dev. No. 8/2010, 2010) (referring 
to the 74th CAA’s goal of providing “‘adequate representation’ of women and 
the so-called ‘weaker sections’ (an official euphemism for people from histori-
cally lower castes)”); see also Sharma, supra note 6, at 89 (explaining that the 
74th CAA was designed to “revamp the performance ability of municipalities 
so that they are able to discharge their duties efficiently”). 
2014] SLUM-FREE CITIES PROGRAM 917 
Amendment Act (“74th CAA”).8 The 74th CAA was intended to 
strengthen urban governance through constitutional recogni-
tion of urban local bodies (“ULBs”) as the “third tier of urban 
governments.”9 However, the implementation of this constitu-
tional amendment has largely been left in the hands of state 
governments, which in many cases have resisted a genuine del-
egation of power to local governments and their citizenry.10 
As India’s central government pursues its newest urban re-
development program, Rajiv Awas Yojana (“RAY”)—a slum-
free cities program—it is imperative to question whether there 
are local governance frameworks in place to protect the inter-
ests of politically disenfranchised slum dwellers, consistent 
with the programmatic goals of RAY and the constitutional 
mandate of the 74th CAA. Local government capacity is a criti-
cal consideration in the context of RAY since RAY’s jurisdic-
tional design embraces a cooperative federalist model.11 Under 
this model, the central government crafted the slum-free cities 
mandate and set out the programmatic objectives: the partici-
pating state governments are responsible for program admin-
																																																																																																																												
 8. INDIA CONST. art. 243P–243ZG, amended by The Constitution (Seven-
ty-Fourth Amendment) Act, Part IX-A, 1993. Various provisions of the 74th 
CAA make clear that while the amendment was passed in 1992, it did not go 
into full force until 1993. Id. art. 232I, 243N, 243ZF. Ramaswamy v. Banga-
lore Development Authority, (2010) Unreported Judgments (India), available 
at http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=36309 (describing 
the “inadequate devolution of powers and functions” at the state level that 
prompted the 74th CAA). 
 9. MINISTRY OF HOUS. & URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION, IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE 74TH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, STATE LEVEL REFORMS UNDER 
JNNURM 2 (2011) (India) [hereinafter JNNURM IMPLEMENTATION]. 
 10. Harriss, supra note 7, at 9; see also NAT’L INST. OF URBAN AFFAIRS, 
IMPACT OF THE CONSTITUTION (74TH AMENDMENT) ACT ON THE WORKING OF 
URBAN LOCAL BODIES xiii (2005) [hereinafter WORKING OF URBAN LOCAL 
BODIES] available at 
http://www.niua.org/Publications/research_studies/74caa_v1/Impact%20of%2
0the%2074th%20CAA-Consolidated%20Report%20Vol%20-%20I.pdf (pointing 
out that even when states take steps to create ward committees, those ward 
committees remain nonfunctional). 
 11. See PAUL E. PETERSON ET AL., WHEN FEDERALISM WORKS 7 (1986) (in-
troducing the concept of cooperative federalism in the context of U.S. grant-
in-aid programs initiated in the 1960s, which involved municipal, state, and 
federal agencies). 
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istration and the local governments are tasked with program 
implementation.12 
RAY set out a three-pronged approach to improving existing 
slums13 and preventing future slum development:14 (1) inte-
grating slums into the formal system of government so slum 
dwellers can access the same basic amenities as neighboring 
urban residents, (2) tackling the structural issues within In-
dia’s formal system of government that cause the creation of 
slums, and (3) addressing affordable housing shortages for the 
urban poor, which lead to extralegal solutions like slum devel-
opment in order to survive.15 
RAY employs a property rights strategy to prevent displace-
ment of slum dwellers.16 Each qualifying state is to provide 
slum dwellers with a legal document of entitlement to ensure 
that residents will be able to access dwelling spaces at an af-
fordable cost and receive proper services while new dwelling 
units are being constructed.17 In theory, property entitlements 
are supposed to prevent the displacement of slum dwellers in 
the face of redevelopment.18 However, without the framework 
of strong local governments and mandatory local participation, 
the assignment of property rights to slum dwellers may not be 
enough to deter displacement. This Note argues that full com-
pliance with the 74th CAA is needed before RAY can be imple-
mented in a fashion that is genuinely protective of the rights of 
slum dwellers. 
But, before reaching the argument that local governments 
are not strong enough to be protective of slum-dwellers’ inter-
ests, it is necessary to begin with a basic question: why should 
																																																																																																																												
 12. RAY GUIDELINES ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, supra note 5, at 3. 
 13. See MINISTRY OF HOUS. & URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION, DRAFT 
GUIDELINES FOR PREPARATION OF A SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF ACTION UNDER 
THE RAJIV AWAS YOJANA 2 (2011) [hereinafter SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF 
ACTION], available at http://mhupa.gov.in/ray/planning_guidelines.pdf. 
 14. Id. (describing the prevention of future slums as a preventative strate-
gy). 
 15. Id. at 1. 
 16. MINISTRY OF HOUS. & URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION, DRAFT MODEL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS TO SLUM DWELLERS ACT 5 (2011). 
 17. See id.; see also Nisha Kumar Kulkarni, Revisiting Property Rights for 
Slum-Dwellers, SEARCHLIGHT S. ASIA (Feb. 26, 2013) (“[The bill] gives eligible 
slum-dwellers a dwelling of 25 square meters of carpet area, or its equivalent 
land area, at an affordable cost.”). 
 18. Id. at 6. 
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local governments be involved in India’s redistributive pro-
grams in the first place? It is conceivable that the shifting of 
implementation functions to local governments with more lim-
ited capacity actually hinders the proper execution of RAY, and 
a more centralized system is preferred.19 Alternatively, one 
could argue that the central government’s top-down design of 
RAY’s slum-clearance program leads to its own set of ineffi-
ciencies, and a significant degree of local control is needed for 
effective implementation.20 After placing these competing nar-
ratives in the context of contemporary theories of jurisdictional 
design, this Note argues that RAY’s jurisdictional model is in-
deed the correct approach, but requires a strong framework for 
resolving jurisdictional conflicts between state and local ac-
tors.21 To strengthen India’s local governance framework, this 
Note advocates for an amendment to the Constitution of India 
(“Constitution”) alongside new central government oversight 
functions to expressly and functionally shift delegatory author-
ity of planning functions from states to the central government. 
Such an amendment would ensure that wholly local planning 
																																																																																																																												
 19. See CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND LOCAL 
DEMOCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS AND THE COURTS 31 (2011). Institutional design 
hinges on the governmental objectives at stake. Id. If the goal is to under-
stand local preferences and match government resources to those preferences, 
local autonomy may be more appropriate. Id. But if local governance struc-
tures are weak, their involvement may actually hinder political accountabil-
ity. See MINISTRY OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE AND 
INCLUSIVE URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES: A GUIDEBOOK FOR PROJECT 
IMPLEMENTERS AND POLICY MAKERS IN INDIA 12 (2011) (India) [hereinafter 
DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES], 
available at http://www.urbaninfrastructureindia.org/guidebook.html (“If 
local government is fundamentally constrained with weak finances and/or 
limited mandate, it has minimal influence in shaping development, and can-
not be seriously held accountable for improving the living conditions in the 
city.”). 
 20. See DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE 
SERVICES, supra note 19, at 12 (detailing the challenges associated with state 
and central government tackling everyday quality-of-life issues for urban 
dwellers). 
 21. See Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Gov-
ernments, 83 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1347 (1997). Gillette sets out a framework for 
analyzing jurisdictional conflict through the introduction of the “decentral-
ized trump,” which he describes as a “situation in which legislation enacted 
by a decentralized unit of government prevails over legislation enacted by the 
centralized unit of government of which the decentralized unit is a part.” Id. 
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functions, which are often trapped in a battle between state 
and local authorities, reside in local hands. 
Part I of this Note presents theories of jurisdictional design to 
argue that central government oversight with local implemen-
tation is preferred in light of RAY’s programmatic mandates. 
Part I proceeds with a discussion on the history of local urban 
governance in India. Part II introduces the 74th CAA and ad-
dresses the implementation challenges associated with this 
constitutional amendment. Part III introduces Rajiv Awas 
Yojana’s slum-free cities program and considers whether an 
allocation of property rights under RAY will effectively protect 
the interests of slum dwellers, particularly when full compli-
ance with the 74th CAA has not yet been achieved. Finally, 
Part IV recommends an amendment to India’s Constitution to 
foster compliance with the 74th CAA while granting more au-
tonomy to local governments. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Theories of Jurisdictional Design 
This Note’s primary concern is that India’s slum-clearance 
program will inadequately protect the rights of slum dwellers 
given the limited capacity of local governments. Yet this hy-
pothesis requires some unpacking—embedded in it is a prefer-
ence for local government implementation. Some of the hall-
marks of local implementation include democratizing functions, 
like the fostering of broad-based local participation and “pref-
erence satisfaction,” or in other words, responsiveness to com-
munity preferences about what public goods local government 
should provide and at what level.22 
However, there are a number of other plausible jurisdictional 
arrangements to consider.23 For instance, RAY could have been 
designed as a program both funded and administered by the 
central government.24 Or alternatively, the central and state 
governments could share funding and administration responsi-
																																																																																																																												
 22. GILLETTE, supra note 19, at 34. Gillette also references Charles Tie-
bout’s influential observations on jurisdictional competition based on bundles 
of public goods, whereby residents vote through locational decisions to access 
their preferred set of municipal services. Id. 
 23. Id. at 31(“[D]etermining the proper scope of local autonomy is largely a 
question of institutional design.”). 
 24. Gillette, supra note 21, at 1347. 
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bilities without the participation of local governments.25 And 
yet another scenario is one where RAY is entirely decentral-
ized, where local governments create and fund their own slum-
clearance programs.26 
RAY’s existing jurisdictional design—with central govern-
ment design, state administration, and local implementation—
is preferred so long as there are strong mechanisms in place to 
resolve jurisdictional conflict and genuinely delegate imple-
mentation to local planning bodies.27 But at present, the partial 
implementation of the 74th CAA leaves the door open for fre-
quent jurisdictional conflict between state and local govern-
ments on program implementation.28 Until full implementation 
of the 74th CAA is achieved, perhaps through a constitutional 
amendment, local governments will be unable to adequately 
protect the property rights of slum dwellers during the redevel-
opment process. 
Intuitively, it is unsurprising that the jurisdictional design 
for a particular program should vary with public sector objec-
tives.29 Redistributive programs, which shift resources from 
one segment of the population to benefit another group, pose 
unique challenges for local governments.30 To illustrate the dy-
namic, imagine a simple theoretical example involving two 
nearby cities—City A and City B. City A undertakes a program 
that redistributes wealth to low-income residents, while City 
B’s policies remain unchanged. Low-income residents in City B 
will flock to City A to tap into City A’s redistributive pro-
grams.31 But that is not the only population shift that occurs: 
middle- and high-income residents of City A will move to City 
B to escape the tax burdens associated with City A’s redistribu-
tive programs.32 Consequently, City A suffers the loss of a core 
																																																																																																																												
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 1348. 
 30. See PETERSON, supra note 11, at 15–16. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. An alternative outcome, though one regularly subject to legal 
challenges in the United States, is for municipalities to adopt land use con-
trols that inhibit the entry of lower-income individuals and safeguard a com-
bination of low taxes and desirable municipal services. See Norman Williams 
Jr., Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 317, 
344 (1955) (discussing the underlying motivations for economic exclusion 
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portion of its tax base and is saddled with residents that will 
require a costly set of social programs.33 
It is this possibility of flight between cities that creates a col-
lective action problem among local governments—“no local gov-
ernment will provide redistributive services on its own initia-
tive for fear that it will be unduly burdened by a social problem 
while others escape responsibility or, as is often said in this 
connection, ride free.”34 Solving this collective action problem 
may require a jurisdictional reorganization of the redistributive 
program to include state and national actors.35 
Broader participation across various levels of government al-
lows for localized costs and generalized benefits to be shared 
more evenly.36 As legal scholar Clayton Gillette explains: “if the 
objective of government is to solve collective action problems in 
the provision of a public good, then government boundaries 
should coincide with the geographical scope of the benefits gen-
erated by government provision or production of that good.”37 
Many redistributive programs provide widespread social bene-
fits beyond the immediate recipients, but the burdens remain 
entirely localized.38 Central and state government intervention 
																																																																																																																												
within local communities, including the preservation of property values and 
neighborhood character). 
 33. See PETERSON, supra note 11, at 15–16. 
 34. Id. at 16. But see GILLETTE, supra note 19, at 31 (testing this conven-
tional theory of local redistribution and urban finance, and arguing that 
there are indeed circumstances where “a locality characterized by a well-
working political process would be willing to adopt local redistributive pro-
grams”). 
 35. Gillette, supra note 21, at 1348. 
 36. See PETERSON, supra note 11, at 16. There is also an important role for 
courts to play in assessing the legal validity of local redistributive programs 
and setting precedents that could be adopted across a region. For instance, in 
the exclusionary zoning context, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Southern 
Burlington NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel set a precedent for looking 
regionally to assess local affordable housing burdens, noting that “the univer-
sal and constant need for [affordable] housing is so important and of such 
broad public interest that the general welfare which developing municipali-
ties like Mount Laurel must consider extends beyond their boundaries and 
cannot be parochially confined to the claimed good of the particular munici-
pality.” 67 N.J. 151, 179 (1975). 
 37. Gillette, supra note 21, at 1348. 
 38. See PETERSON, supra note 11, at 16 (explaining the far-reaching im-
pacts of a given local government’s program: “If, however, a locality does not 
redistribute resources to help those in need, other localities suffer: either they 
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may be warranted in a situation where redistributive programs 
are addressing concerns that impact several spatial frames: 
local, regional, and perhaps even national.39 
Assuming central government intervention is needed, one 
must question how much responsibility central governments 
should take on for a given redistributive program. While cen-
tral governments can help adjust burdens and incentives in 
support of local redistribution, the conventional fear is that 
they will be too far removed from localized social issues to in-
tervene effectively.40 Some theorists have turned to the follow-
ing distinction for determining what level of central govern-
ment intervention is appropriate: when programs can be ad-
ministered on relatively objective and easily reviewable 
terms—like a welfare cash award or a social security pay-
ment—centralized funding and administration may be the 
most efficient.41 Alternatively, when a redistributive program 
involves the public provision of a commodity—like housing or 
other social services—coordination with local government is 
often needed for effective implementation.42 
This theoretical distinction suggests that RAY’s jurisdictional 
design may very well be ideal in light of its more nuanced pro-
grammatic objectives: upgrading slum conditions and providing 
suitable affordable housing for the poor.43 Then again, what 
this distinction does not capture is the potential for jurisdic-
tional conflict. In his analysis of local government involvement 
in redistributive programs, Gillette pointed to the potential for 
jurisdictional conflict when multiple layers of government are 
(or could be) involved.44 These conflicts generally relate to am-
																																																																																																																												
must take up the burden or their residents must witness the resultant suffer-
ing”). 
 39. Gillette, supra note 21, at 1347. 
 40. See ROBERT DAHL & EDWARD TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 134–35 
(1973) (noting that “a larger political system, confronted by the disad-
vantages of boundaries larger than the problems it wishes to deal with by 
uniform rules, may be driven successively from one alternative to the next 
until it has transformed itself into a congeries of smaller political systems”). 
 41. See PETERSON, supra note 11, at 17 (emphasis added). 
 42. Id.; see also Gillette, supra note 21, at 1348–49 (“If the function [of 
government] is to foster self governance, the government should be small 
enough to permit participation.”). 
 43. SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 13. 
 44. Gillette, supra note 21, at 1354 (explaining that although there may be 
“significant advantages to retaining some degree of autonomy at the decen-
924 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 39:2 
biguous statutory or constitutional language that may under-
mine local authority.45 Thus, when a redistributive program 
involves multiple jurisdictional layers, clear statutory and con-
stitutional delegations can help to minimize jurisdictional con-
flict.46 
In addition, this statutory and constitutional language should 
embrace local governance structures by formalizing some de-
gree of autonomy.47 Legal scholars have long addressed the 
tendency of courts and legislatures to undermine the power of 
local institutions.48 For instance, David J. Barron’s seminal 
piece on localism in the United States described the historically 
weak protections given to local governance structures.49 Barron 
underscored the importance of these local structures in promot-
ing substantive constitutional values and offering a forum for a 
counter-majoritarian voice.50 Barron’s powerful defense of local-
ism stressed that: 
[t]owns and cities are often the institutions that are most di-
rectly responsible for structuring political struggles over the 
most contentious public questions, whether they concern the 
proper means of overcoming racial stratification, securing 
quality public education, or protecting disfavored groups from 
private discrimination.51 
Theoretical contributions on the importance of localism and the 
risks of jurisdictional conflict therefore suggest the need for 
clear constitutional and statutory delegations that both stabi-
lize local entities and promote local autonomy.52 By providing 
unambiguous constitutional and statutory underpinnings for 
localism, governance structures are better equipped to support 
																																																																																																																												
tralized level,” decisions need to be made on how to resolve conflict across 
different jurisdictional levels). 
 45. GILLETTE, supra note 19, at 26. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Con-
stitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 487–91 (1999) (defending the im-
portant public functions that local governments play in society and critiquing 
the current treatment of local governance in the United States). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 490–91. 
 51. Id. at 491. 
 52. Gillette, supra note 21, at 1347; Barron, supra note 47, at 490–91. 
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complex jurisdictional designs like RAY, which involve multiple 
layers of government in a redistributive program. 
B. The History of Local Governance in India 
The above analysis on jurisdictional design applies when 
there are democratic institutions at various spatial increments 
(e.g., state and local) to collaborate with.53 India’s democratic 
governance structures have the unique feature of being embod-
ied in the very text of the Constitution.54 Although urban gov-
ernance structures have existed in India for centuries, the con-
stitutional recognition of local government is a recent innova-
tion.55 
During the British colonial period, there were several well-
documented efforts to expand municipal administration, begin-
ning with the Charter of James II in 1687, which granted legal 
authority to the East India Company to create municipal cor-
porations.56 In the nineteenth century, there was widespread 
understanding of the need for local institutions to address the 
unsanitary conditions that were widespread across India’s 
towns and cities, and municipalities soon proliferated.57 How-
																																																																																																																												
 53. See PETERSON, supra note 11, at 6 (noting that cooperative federalism 
requires multiple layers of government that depend on one another). 
 54. See INDIA CONST. art. 243P–243ZG, amended by The Constitution (Sev-
enty-Fourth Amendment) Act, Part IX-A, 1993. Cf. Barron, supra note 47, at 
490 (pointing out that local governments, like towns, are not part of the Unit-
ed States’ federal constitutional structure). 
 55. Soumen Bagchi, Decentralised Urban Governance in India: Implica-
tions for Urban Infrastructure, ECON. & POL. WKLY. (2004) (tracing municipal 
administration to India’s ancient beginnings—the period of the Indus Valley 
Civilization (2300–1750 B.C.)); see also Rumi Aijaz, Challenges for Urban 
Local Governments in India 6 (Asia Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 19, 
2007) (noting that evidence of urban life in the Indus Valley Civilization ex-
isted in the form of “wide streets, market places, public offices, community 
baths, drainage and sewerage system[s]”). 
 56. Bagchi, supra note 55, at 2 (detailing additional steps toward decen-
tralization, such as the creation of the Mayor’s Court in 1726 in the three 
Presidency towns of Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta); see Vikrant Narayan 
Vasudeva, Legal Intervention in Poverty Alleviation: Enriching the Poor 
Through Law, 2 NUJS L. REV. 447, 447 (2010) (remarking on how the coloni-
al period marked India’s “plunge into mass poverty”). 
 57. Aijaz, supra note 55, at 6. In 1850, the British Colonial Government 
passed an act that created local committees designed to improve public 
health. Id. However, there were still significant barriers to public participa-
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ever, the strengthening of municipal institutions was not with-
out considerable resistance; many central government officials 
considered the decentralization reforms of the late 1800s too 
radical.58 Moreover, Indians struggled to obtain political rights 
within the newly constituted urban governance frameworks, 
while British “district officers in those days were not sympa-
thetic to the idea of extension of the elective principle.”59 
Although there were a few isolated examples of genuine inte-
gration of Indians in the administration of the colonial gov-
ernment, most power remained firmly entrenched in the hands 
of unelected district officers that were reluctant to implement 
decentralization reforms.60 The passage of the Government of 
India Act in 1919 was the colonial regime’s first formal statuto-
ry attempt to transfer power from district officers to popularly 
elected local bodies.61 Yet, this decentralization effort was un-
successful, in part because of an inadequate legal framework 
for regulating municipal affairs.62 In fact, “several municipali-
ties [were] superseded on the charges of corruption and ineffi-
ciency,” which significantly undermined the decentralization 
movement.63 The power struggles and pitfalls associated with 
the British colonial regime’s decentralization reforms would 
																																																																																																																												
tion in 1863, when the Royal Army Sanitation Commission reported the “fast 
deteriorating sanitation conditions” across the country. Id. 
 58. Id. at 7. In 1882, Lord Ripon was a staunch advocate for local self-
government, financial decentralization, and elections to constitute local bod-
ies. Municipal Acts were passed under Lord Ripon that embodied these prin-
ciples, but “achieved little success, since they were considered too radical.” Id. 
 59. Id. at 6. In the late 1800s, “municipalities [were] established in every 
town of importance. However, these municipal bodies were completely under 
the control of the district magistrate and the town people were associated 
only for raising funds for the maintenance of police, conservancy and road 
repairs.” Id. 
 60. Id. at 7. Calcutta and Bombay provided early examples of successful 
local self-government. For instance, in 1888, the Bombay City Municipal 
Corporation Act was passed, which created a City Council comprised of a 
combination of elected and nominated members. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (explaining that “laws governing local bodies enacted during the 
period 1917 to 1937 fail[ed] to prescribe an effective system for day-to-day 
management of municipal affairs; hardly any attention was paid to the ques-
tion of administrative efficiency and fixation of responsibility for the proper 
performance of municipal functions”). 
 63. Id. 
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ultimately turn out to be a familiar refrain for urban dwellers 
over a century later.64 
India became independent from Great Britain in 1947, and 
within three years the sovereign nation had drafted its own 
Constitution.65 Virtually absent from the Constitution was any 
reference to systems of urban governance; legislative authority 
over India’s cities was delegated to the states.66 Until 1992, In-
dia’s Constitution recognized two tiers of government—the na-
tional government and the states as subnational units.67 Alt-
hough some urban local governments remained in place, “they 
were organized on the basis of the ultra vires principle, mean-
ing that there was no established legal authority for their op-
eration and they could be completely dissolved by the states.68 
																																																																																																																												
 64. Mayraj Fahim, Local Government in India Still Carries Characteristics 
of Its Colonial Heritage, CITY MAYORS (May 24, 2009). 
 65. Aijaz, supra note 55, at 7; see also Shubham Chaudhuri, What Differ-
ence Does a Constitutional Amendment Make? The 1994 Panchayati Raj Act 
and the Attempt to Revitalize Rural Local Government in India (Columbia 
Univ., Working Paper 4, 2003). India’s post-colonial government is structured 
as 
a federal parliamentary democracy made up of 28 states and 7 union 
territories. At the national level, legislative authority rests with the 
two houses of the parliament: the Lok Sabha (House of the People), 
which consists of 545 members, all but two of whom are directly 
elected from single-member parliamentary constituencies distribut-
ed proportionally on the basis of population among the state and un-
ion territories; and to a lesser extent, the Rajya Sabha (Council of 
States), which has no more than 250 members, most of whom are in-
directly elected by the members of the state legislative assemblies of 
the various states. 
Id. 
 66. Aijaz, supra note 55, at 7. While there were provisions for the govern-
ance of rural settlements, the Constitution’s only direction with respect to 
urban local government was to delegate authority to state governments with-
out any specific direction. Id.; see also Chaudhuri, supra note 65, at 4 (de-
scribing the structure of the Constitution prior to the 74th CAA, with List 1 
(the Union List), where the Central government has exclusive authority, and 
List 2, with the areas where states have exclusive legislative authority). Are-
as where states were granted authority include “law and order, public health, 
agriculture, wealth taxes, land tenure, and land reforms, and most notably in 
the current context, functions of local government.” Id. 
 67. Chaudhuri, supra note 65, at 4. 
 68. Sharma, supra note 6, at 85 (explaining that since local governments 
were not constitutionally required, “state governments were at liberty to ex-
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India’s local governments were largely neglected, with little 
attention paid to functional issues, like the provision of public 
goods, or structural issues, such as mandating regular elections 
or mechanisms for public participation.69 Meanwhile, the cen-
tral government’s bureaucracy grew as it focused on a system 
of expansive control over economic growth through a mix of tar-
iffs, subsidies, industry regulation, and in some cases, national-
ization of certain industries.70 
In the decades leading up to decentralization reforms, the 
“centralized apparatus of the Indian developmental state” func-
tioned as a barrier to successful revitalization and equitable 
service delivery in cities.71 As one scholar pointed out when dis-
cussing India’s vast central government bureaucracy, “the inef-
ficiency of India’s managed economy is symbolized by the fact 
that a nation with widespread poverty, and unemployment or 
underemployment, has at the same time one of the world’s 
most capital intensive developing economies.”72 The inequality 
associated with India’s centrally-managed economy led to ques-
tions about the proper role for the central government in the 
marketplace and how to craft redistributive programs that 
benefit the poor.73 
																																																																																																																												
tend or control the powers through executive decisions without an amend-
ment to legislative provisions”). 
 69. Aijaz, supra note 55, at 7 (noting that local governments were neglect-
ed in the 1950s without formal constitutional recognition); see also 
Chaudhuri, supra note 65, at 2 (explaining that the 74th CAA provided the 
impetus for regular elections and more representative participation in gov-
ernment). 
 70. DENNIS C. MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 32 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 1996). 
 71. Chaudhuri, supra note 65, at 4 (tracing India’s dismal record in the 
provision of public goods and in the sphere of human development); see also 
MUELLER, supra note 70, at 32–33. As of 1996, when this text was written, 
poverty rates were roughly the same as they were pre-independence, with 
50% of the population living in poverty. Id. Mueller notes that “at least some 
of the blame of this poor performance must be placed on India’s government 
and its political institutions.” Id. 
 72. MUELLER, supra note 70, at 32. 
 73. Id. at 33. India poses the question of “the proper role of government in 
providing those goods and services that government can provide more effi-
ciently than the market, and also the question of the optimal amount of re-
distribution.” Id. Additional examples of the inefficiency of the central gov-
ernment include the lack of spending on education relative to other develop-
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The central government’s oversight of urban governance pro-
vides an illuminating example of inefficiency within its bureau-
cratic apparatus.74 Rather than identifying a particular minis-
try to focus on urban governance issues, the central govern-
ment erratically shifted primary oversight between different 
ministries, which limited meaningful policy reform in cities.75 
Despite (or perhaps, because of) the central government’s 
fragmented approach to urban governance, a more concerted 
effort began in earnest in the late 1980s to strengthen urban 
local governments.76 One scholar pointed out how the decen-
tralization effort was uniquely driven by generalized social and 
economic forces: 
[W]hereas in some countries the impetus for decentralization 
has come from external sources or has been triggered by an 
economic crisis, in India, it was home-grown and there was no 
single precipitating event that led to the reform. That is not to 
say, however, that the pressure for reforms came from the 
grassroots. Instead the reforms reflected the emergence of a 
remarkable consensus among India’s policy-making and intel-
lectual elites. 77 
Prior to the 74th CAA, there were two failed attempts at con-
stitutional amendments to strengthen urban local govern-
ments: the first in 1989 (the 63rd Amendment) and the second 
in 1991 (the 73rd Amendment Bill).78 One of the main argu-
ments against constitutional recognition of urban local gov-
ernments was that it would constrain the rights of state gov-
																																																																																																																												
ing nations, and the challenges the police face in controlling public order, 
with violence steadily increasing over the last twenty years. Id. 
 74. Id. at 32. (“A vast bureaucracy was created to guide the economy, a 
bureaucracy that has grown more corrupt and inefficient over time.”). 
 75. Aijaz, supra note 55, at 7 (listing the many agencies that had overlap-
ping responsibilities for overseeing urban local governments, including the 
Ministry of Health, Ministry of Works, Ministry of Housing and Urban De-
velopment, Ministry of Health and Family Planning, etc.). 
 76. Id. In 1985, the Ministry of Urban Development was created, function-
ing as a coordinating agency for urban governance. The National Commission 
on Urbanisation was also established to analyze the increasing trend toward 
urbanization in India. Id. But see Harriss, supra note 7, at 5 (remarking that 
the constitutional reform efforts were focused on rural governance structures 
rather than decentralization for urban local government; the enactment of 
the 74th CAA was described as “an afterthought” for urban areas). 
 77. Chaudhuri, supra note 65, at 4. 
 78. Aijaz, supra note 55, at 7–8. 
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ernment.79 As one local government advisor described the de-
bate, “a primary reason for the delay was that local govern-
ments were perceived to be rivals, rather than complements, by 
state governments. Hence, local government was not main-
tained with commitment and sufficiently empowered in the 
post-independence era.”80 
II. COMPLIANCE WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE 74TH 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ACT 
There are numerous examples of central governments initiat-
ing decentralization reforms.81 But what distinguishes India’s 
decentralization effort is that the central government created 
the 74th CAA, but left implementation of the letter and spirit 
of the 74th CAA to the states.82 As will be more fully discussed 
in Part II.B, India’s state-level implementation model has led 
to mixed results, with weak compliance in areas critically im-
portant to local participation.83 The central government has 
initiated programs to foster greater compliance with the 74th 
CAA, like the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mis-
sion, but it remains unclear whether such programs have tan-
gibly advanced the decentralization agenda.84 
																																																																																																																												
 79. See Fashim, supra note 64. States exercised varying degrees of power 
over functions that were ultimately devolved to local governments in the 74th 
CAA. See Darley Jose Kjosavik & Nadarajah Shanmugaratnam, Between De-
centralized Planning and Neo-liberalism: Challenges for the Survival of In-
digenous People of Kerala, India, 40 SOC. POL’Y & ADMIN. 632, 633 (2006) (de-
scribing the serious impact that decentralization had on the state of Kerala in 
light of the state’s significant role in development projects). 
 80. Fashim, supra note 64. 
 81. Chaudhuri, supra note 65, at 2. 
 82. In many other countries “the impetus for decentralization reforms orig-
inated at the national level and implementation responsibility also resided at 
the national level.” Id. 
 83. JNNURM IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 9, at 2. (“The existing legal 
framework as defined by the state municipal acts was not conducive for im-
plementing the provisions of the 74th CAA in its true spirit.”). 
 84. See M.P. MATHUR, IMPACT OF THE CONSTITUTION (74TH) AMENDMENT ACT 
ON URBAN LOCAL BODIES: A REVIEW, NAT’L INST. OF URBAN AFFAIRS (2007) (of-
fering the most comprehensive summary to date on decentralization reforms). 
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A. Passage of the 74th CAA and Core Provisions for Local Par-
ticipation 
There are competing narratives on the political forces that ul-
timately tipped the scales in favor of a constitutional amend-
ment.85 One narrative relates to the growing frustration 
around the poor living conditions in the cities, while the other 
suggests that there were strong political forces advocating for 
local governance structures in rural areas, and cities were in-
cluded merely as an afterthought.86 While the true impetus 
remains in question, the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act 
eventually passed in 1992, providing the constitutional under-
pinnings for local government entities in cities.87 A landmark 
step toward decentralization, the 74th CAA gives legal recogni-
tion to urban local bodies (“ULBs”), creating a uniform local 
governance structure for cities across the country.88 The 74th 
CAA recognizes that ULBs can foster more community partici-
pation, address unmet infrastructure needs, fight poverty, and 
promote equity.89 Included in the contents of the 74th CAA are 
four mechanisms to achieve these goals.90 
First, the 74th CAA sets out three different types of munici-
palities based on the urban landscape.91 Nagar panchayat is 
the designation for areas that are transitioning from rural to 
urban, municipal councils are for smaller urban areas, and 
																																																																																																																												
 85. Harriss, supra note 7, at 5. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. D.P. Tiwari, Challenges in Urban Planning for Local Bodies in India, 
GEOSPATIAL MEDIA & COMM., available at http://www.gisdevelopment.net/ 
application/urban/overview/urbano0037a.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2014). 
 89. JNNURM IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 9, at 2. See also DEVELOPING 
SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES, supra note 19, 
at 12. The 74th CAA designates local institutions as the providers of urban 
services, including the development of new parks, support for new employ-
ment opportunities, and investment in core infrastructure like “water, sewer 
and electrical supply.” The amendment was also designed to address the 
problem of “representational distance,” where urban dwellers would have to 
turn to the state capital to address everyday issues. Id. The 74th CAA, 
through its formal acknowledgement of local institutions, aimed to mitigate 
“[the] wide gap between citizens and central or state representatives [which] 
create[d] a relatively small and privileged group of high-powered brokers 
[and] encourage[d] trading money for access.” Id. 
 90. INDIA CONST. art. 243P–243ZG, amended by The Constitution (Seven-
ty-Fourth Amendment) Act, Part IX-A, 1993. 
 91. Id. art. 243Q. 
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municipal corporations are for larger urban areas.92 The 74th 
CAA also identifies a number of factors to be used when classi-
fying municipalities into one of these categories, including pop-
ulation size and density, percentage of employment in non-
agricultural activities, and the revenue generated for local ad-
ministration.93 
Second, the 74th CAA calls for the creation and constitution 
of ward committees as the smallest units of political represen-
tation within the ULBs.94 These committees are designed as a 
“means of increased democratic participation and of delibera-
tive decision making.”95 While the 74th CAA mandates that 
municipal areas with populations of 300,000 or more be divided 
into wards,96 the states retain significant discretion with re-
spect to the ward boundaries, the composition of ward commit-
tees, and the process for constituting these ward committees.97 
Additionally, the 74th CAA makes clear that states are free to 
create local participatory bodies in addition to ward commit-
tees.98 
Third, the 74th CAA requires local elections within munici-
palities,99 with spots reserved for women and constitutionally 
recognized disadvantaged groups.100 One-third of the seats on a 
ward committee must be reserved for women belonging to 
scheduled castes or scheduled tribes.101 This constitutional pro-
vision is designed to allow politically weak groups, like women 
																																																																																																																												
 92. Id. art. 243Q(a). 
 93. Id. art. 243Q(2) 
 94. Id. art. 243S. 
 95. Harriss, supra note 7, at 9. See also Vani S. Kulkami, The Making and 
Unmaking of Local Democracy in an Indian Village, 642 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 152, 153 n.2 (describing the 74th CAA as “an extraordinary 
impetus to local democracy” in the context of governance at the village level). 
 96. INDIA CONST. art. 243R, amended by The Constitution (Seventy-Fourth 
Amendment) Act, Part IX-A, 1993 (“[A]ll the seats in a Municipality shall be 
filled by persons chosen by direct election from the territorial constituencies 
in the Municipal area and for this purpose each municipal area shall be di-
vided into territorial constituencies known as wards.”). 
 97. Id. art. 243S. 
 98. Id. (“[N]othing in this article shall be deemed to prevent the Legisla-
ture of a State from making any provision for the constitution of Committees 
in addition to the Ward Committees.”). 
 99. Id. art. 243R. 
 100. Id. art. 243T. 
 101. Id. 
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and those belonging to lower castes, to leverage the ULBs as a 
forum for civic participation.102 
Lastly, the 74th CAA delegates specific governmental func-
tions to municipalities103 and grants them the authority to levy 
and collect taxes to carry out those functions.104 The Twelfth 
Schedule of the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act identifies 
eighteen separate functions and responsibilities that should be 
delegated to local bodies through state legislation.105 These 
functions include urban planning, public health, urban poverty 
alleviation, and slum improvement.106 
The delegation of substantive functions to local governments 
and the ability to raise revenue to carry out those functions are 
at the core of local empowerment.107 However, that delegation 
of power was left entirely at the discretion of the states in the 
74th CAA with the following permissive language: “the Legisla-
ture of a State, may, by law, endow—(a) the Municipalities 
with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable 
them to function as institutions of self government.”108 The 
74th CAA uses the same permissive language in its discussion 
of taxes and funds for local governments.109 
A close reading of the 74th CAA reveals that in addition to 
the broad latitude that state governments have over the estab-
lishment of ward committees, they retain full control over the 
delegation of Twelfth Schedule functions.110 Although the Con-
stitution sets out a number of substantive planning functions 
for local governments, delegation does not occur unless a state 
																																																																																																																												
 102. Harriss, supra note 7, at 5. 
 103. INDIA CONST. art. 243W, amended by The Constitution (Seventy-Fourth 
Amendment) Act, Part IX-A, 1993. 
 104. Id. art. 243X. 
 105. Id. art. 243W, Twelfth Schedule; see also Tiwari, supra note 88, at 2–3. 
 106. Id. art. 243W, Twelfth Schedule; see also D.S. Meshram, Interface Be-
tween Various Agencies under 74th CAA, INST. TOWN PLANNERS INDIA J., Oct. 
2004, at 13, available at http://itpi.org.in/pdfs/oct2004/chapter3.pdf (noting 
the need for state governments to delegate power over environmental and 
urban planning functions to municipalities to comply with the Twelfth 
Schedule). 
 107. Tiwari, supra note 88, at 2–3. 
 108. INDIA CONST. art. 243W, amended by The Constitution (Seventy-Fourth 
Amendment) Act, Part IX-A, 1993. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.; see also DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE URBAN 
INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES, supra note 19, at 11 (noting that “much of the 
content of the 74th CAA is not mandatory”). 
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decides to enact legislation conferring local authority.111 As one 
scholar observed, the 74th CAA merely calls upon states to 
“devolve powers and resources to local bodies” so they can func-
tion as autonomous institutions.112 The 74th CAA clearly artic-
ulates a substantive role for ULBs to provide public goods, en-
gage in local planning, reduce poverty, and promote equity.113 
Those roles, by constitutional design, hinge on permissive state 
legislative action.114 
Thus, the 74th CAA’s delegation of substantive powers to lo-
cal governments—the heart of political empowerment—is con-
ditioned on a willingness of state governments to relinquish 
control of certain substantive areas. This makes decentraliza-
tion uniquely challenging for India: “unlike in many other 
countries where the impetus for decentralization originated at 
the national level and implementation responsibility also re-
sided at the national level, in India, the final responsibility for 
the design and implementation of local government reforms lay 
with the states.”115 
B. Implementation Challenges Associated with the 74th CAA 
Decentralization mandates have been undermined by state 
governments trying to retain control over the substantive areas 
designated for local authority, like land use planning and de-
velopment.116 Additionally, many state politicians have felt 
threatened by the prospect of decentralization, “fear[ing] the 
possible loss of their powers of patronage.”117 One political the-
																																																																																																																												
 111. See Subramaniam Vincent & Meera K, Janaspandanas or Ward Com-
mittees: Calling the Bluff, CITIZEN MATTERS (July 20, 2009), 
http://bangalore.citizenmatters.in/blogs/editors-blog/blog_posts/1222-
government-janaspandanas-or-ward-committees-calling-the-bluff (describing 
the shortsightedness of the 74th CAA in allowing the state governments to 
have control over the composition of ward committees). 
 112. Chaudhuri, supra note 65, at 2. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Harriss, supra note 7, at 7; see also JnNURM Primer (stating that 
in order to implement the decentralization agenda, “an attitudinal change” is 
needed such that states no longer view ULBs as adversaries, but as partners 
to strengthen the governance in their state). 
 117. Harriss, supra note 7, at 10. 
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orist analogized state-level implementation of the 74th CAA to 
driving with one foot on the gas and the other on the brake.118 
There are a number of studies that evaluate decentralization 
following the 74th CAA.119 Yet, it is instructive to begin with a 
brief examination of the social and economic forces that have 
hindered decentralization reforms. One dynamic that scholars 
have observed are the close ties between central and state gov-
ernments and the capitalist class, which create incentives to 
block local participation.120 Many of the large-scale develop-
ments occurring in India’s cities are advanced through public-
private partnerships, with heavy assistance from the capitalist 
class.121 These public-private development projects are increas-
ingly changing the urban landscape, with one social anthropol-
ogist describing the hegemony of the capitalist class in “shap-
ing the urban form.”122 The challenge for local governments, in 
light of this paradigm, is that they are often not a party to the 
public-private agreements that set the terms for large-scale de-
velopments.123 This is inherently inconsistent with the 74th 
CAA, since the Twelfth Schedule specifically articulates urban 
planning as a function to be devolved to local governance struc-
tures.124 
Nevertheless, this lack of local representation may very well 
be by design.125 Central and state governments are protective 
of their ties to the capitalist class because they want to encour-
age and protect swift, large-scale investment in India’s cities.126 
																																																																																																																												
 118. Id. at 7. 
 119. See, e.g., Bagchi, supra note 55, at 3. A challenge associated with these 
decentralization studies lies with setting conceptual definitions to measure 
decentralization and its impacts on the allocation of public resources and the 
delivery of public goods. Id. 
 120. Harriss, supra note 7, at 7 (considering the dominance of information 
technology firms within the capital class and the real state trends in the city 
of Bangalore where there were frequent direct links between IT firms and 
state and central government agencies). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 7–8. 
 124. Tiwari, supra note 88, at 3. 
 125. Harriss, supra note 7, at 8 (discussing a study on the corporate econo-
mies in cities like Bangalore and Ahmedabad, which found limited opportuni-
ties for local participation, in part because “their definition of public priorities 
is discordant with those that may be expressed by participants in the local 
economies”). 
 126. Id. at 7. 
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Local oversight of urban planning has the potential to slow new 
development, or even derail important infrastructure invest-
ments when there are countervailing community concerns.127 
As a result of these dynamics, local governments face an uphill 
battle when trying to assume genuine control over the land use 
planning process, despite the delegation in the 74th CAA.128 
And where states have delegated some control over municipal 
planning to local bodies, it is regularly undermined by the 
“land poaching” that is characteristic of these public-private 
partnerships.129 
The public-private partnership paradigm, as described above, 
has important class implications for India’s cities.130 The land 
that is “poached” for new development often comes from slum 
areas, where land can be obtained at relatively low costs.131 
Slum dwellers are regularly displaced as state-sponsored de-
velopments result in the demolition of their homes.132 This res-
idential displacement sometimes forces slum dwellers out of 
their existing communities, since the new development drives 
up local land prices.133 Although major development projects 
have the potential to tangibly improve the conditions of slum 
dwellers, the relative weakness of local governance structures 
makes it difficult for the urban poor to secure housing.134 One 
scholar observed that “publicly sponsored mega-projects do lit-
tle to support the local economies that are so important for the 
city’s prosperity, and may disrupt them.”135 
The emphasis on public-private partnerships in India’s rede-
velopment schemes has led states to resist genuine implemen-
tation of the 74th CAA.136 Meanwhile, limited local government 
																																																																																																																												
 127. Solomon Benjamin, Governance and Economic Settings and Poverty in 
Bangalore, Environment and Urbanization, 12 ENV’T & URB. 1, 35–56 (2000); 
see also WORKING OF URBAN LOCAL BODIES, supra note 10, at 1 (noting the 
limited capacity of local institutions). 
 128. Harriss, supra note 7, at 7. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 7–8. 
 131. Benjamin, supra note 127, at 38, 46. 
 132. Id. at 46. 
 133. Id. (noting the increased threat of eviction for slum dwellers as a result 
of these public-private partnerships). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 44–46 (describing the public-private partnerships as a restraint 
of “pro-poor economic activity”). 
 136. Harriss, supra note 7, at 7–8. 
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representation has left slum dwellers without a voice in the 
land use planning process, while the capitalist class works on 
state-endorsed megaprojects that are likely to redefine the 
built form of cities.137 This was precisely the dynamic that the 
74th CAA was intended to correct.138 Yet compliance with the 
letter and spirit of the 74th CAA has been inconsistent at 
best.139 
In 2005, the National Institute for Urban Affairs (“NIUA”) 
conducted the first comprehensive study on the implementa-
tion of the 74th CAA on a national scale.140 Some of the key de-
centralization metrics that NIUA examined include: (1) the 
presence of ULBs, (2) the reservation of seats for women and 
underrepresented castes on those ULBs, (3) local elections held 
with regularity, and (4) the constitution of ward committees.141 
NIUA found that most states were complying with certain pro-
visions of the 74th CAA, like the constitution of ULBs and the 
reservation of seats on those ULBs.142 In addition, most states 
																																																																																																																												
 137. Id. 
 138. WORKING OF URBAN LOCAL BODIES, supra note 10, at vi. 
 139. Harriss, supra note 7, at 7. 
[T]he increasing power of the corporate sector, of the upper middle 
class and of real estate developers over the shaping of urban space 
provides an indication of the failure, so far, to make a reality of the 
intentions of the 74th Amendment with regard to the establishment 
of decentralized democratic governance of the cities. 
Id. 
 140. WORKING OF URBAN LOCAL BODIES, supra note 10, at vii (assessing de-
centralization in twenty-seven states and one union territory in India). 
NIUA’s study was funded by the central government’s Ministry of Urban De-
velopment. Id. NIUA noted that one of the challenges of such a comprehen-
sive assessment was the unavailability of data for certain implementation 
metrics; for instance, gender representation on ward committees. Id. There 
were also certain regions where data was incomplete. Id. For example, there 
were significant data gaps for most of the states in the northeast of India and 
the newly formed states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttaranchal. Id. at 
vii–viii. 
 141. Id. at viii. Unfortunately, data constraints limited NIUA’s ability to 
look closely at the devolution of powers from the Constitution’s Twelfth 
Schedule, like urban planning functions, across states. Therefore, the focus of 
their assessment is on key structural changes connected with the 74th CAA, 
like the abovementioned ULBs and ward committees. Id. 
 142. Id. NIUA found that as of 2005, there were over 3,000 ULBs, and that 
most states had amended their municipal acts in accordance with Article 
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had adopted municipal acts consistent with the 74th CAA to 
include the substantive functions from the Constitution’s 
Twelfth Schedule (e.g., urban planning, poverty alleviation) as 
expressly designated duties of the ULBs.143 However, these 
widespread amendments to state municipal acts should not be 
taken to imply that these substantive duties were functionally 
transferred to the ULBs.144 NIUA noted that in many cases, 
states retained control over substantive duties in the Twelfth 
Schedule, either in part or in full.145 
A look at the status of the ward committees reveals more lim-
ited compliance with the 74th CAA; eight out of twenty-eight 
states, and one out of seven union territories, had ward com-
mittees in place at the time of assessment.146 And even where 
ward committees existed on paper, few were operational.147 
This is a crucial concern when considered within the larger 
context of the decentralization agenda, since ward committees 
are the smallest increment of local government and the prima-
ry tool for public participation among the politically disenfran-
chised.148 When ward committees are constituted, they are 
tasked with vital civic duties (at least on paper) such as tax col-
lection, budget drafting, public grievances, development plan-
ning and monitoring, and slum improvement.149 Structurally, 
ward committees are necessary for ensuring that ULBs are 
able to effectively represent historically weaker sections of the 
urban population.150 
NIUA’s observations on devolution of Twelfth Schedule func-
tions and the constitution of ward committees hints at a more 
generalized finding on compliance with the 74th CAA: state 
legislation delegating power to local institutions is an essential 
first step in the decentralization process, but not always sug-
gestive of genuine implementation of the 74th CAA.151 NIUA 
																																																																																																																												
243(T) of the Constitution to reserve seats for schedule castes, schedule 
tribes, and women in the ULBs. Id. at xi. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id.; see also Harriss, supra note 7, at 10. 
 148. WORKING OF URBAN LOCAL BODIES, supra note 10, at vii; see also Har-
riss, supra note 7, at 10. 
 149. WORKING OF URBAN LOCAL BODIES, supra note 10, at xiii. 
 150. Id. at x. 
 151. Id. at vii. 
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highlighted that even in states that have enacted municipal 
acts to delegate power to local institutions, local participation 
within governance structures remains weak.152 The same is 
true for local revenue streams, where despite local legislative 
authority to recover tax revenue, municipalities encounter se-
rious delays when trying to access needed funds.153 These find-
ings underscore that formal legislative action is not enough to 
implement the 74th CAA. Central government enforcement 
may be necessary to ensure that constitutional mandates and 
state enactments result in an actual devolution of power to lo-
cal governments. 
C. Compliance with the 74th CAA Through the Jawaharal Neh-
ru National Urban Renewal Mission 
In 2005, the same year that NIUA’s comprehensive report on 
the 74th CAA was released, the central government’s Ministry 
for Urban Development and Poverty Alleviation (“MUDPA”) 
created a platform for urban revitalization—the Jawaharal 
Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (“JnNURM”).154 The 
program focuses on a variety of administrative concerns so that 
planned developments in cities can move forward with greater 
efficiency, transparency, and citizen-centric accountability.155 
JnNURM set out a seven-year plan, with a number of reforms 
designed to strengthen ULBs. Among those reforms is imple-
mentation with the letter and spirit of the 74th CAA.156 
																																																																																																																												
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. Even the presence of state finance commissions in some cases did 
little to address delays associated with local governments getting approval to 
generate their own sources of revenue. Id. 
 154. Harriss, supra note 7, at 10. 
The origins of JnNURM are in the commitment made in 2004 in the 
Common Minimum Programme agreed by the Congress Party with 
the parties on which it depended for office, to a “comprehensive pro-
gramme of urban renewal and to a massive expansion of social hous-
ing in towns and cities, paying special attention to the needs of slum 
dwellers.” 
Id. 
 155. JNNURM OVERVIEW, supra note 3, at 5. 
 156. JNNURM IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 9, at 2; see also DEVELOPING 
SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES, supra note 19, 
at 11. Nearly two decades after the passage of the 74th CAA, the spirit of the 
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When explaining the rationale for focusing on implementa-
tion of the 74th CAA, MUDPA echoed many of the findings 
from NIUA’s study, with an emphasis on how states have in-
hibited the autonomous functioning of local governments 
through approvals to generate local revenue.157 In light of those 
findings, MUDPA created a Model Municipal Law (“MML”) for 
state implementation of the 74th CAA.158 The MML is a guide 
for states as they adopt municipal acts that incorporate the 
74th CAA’s decentralization reforms.159 It provides language 
that would allow ULBs to function more autonomously, con-
sistent with the 74th CAA.160 
Much of the MML’s language tracks the mandatory require-
ments of the 74th CAA, such as the creation of local ward 
committees.161 In addition, the MML provides for the transfer 
of key substantive functions to local governments, an enhanced 
ability for local governments to generate revenues, and struc-
tural developments to aid in decentralization.162 The MML also 
proposes that state and local governments work together to 
provide a wider range of services in urban municipalities.163 To 
accomplish this, the MML suggests looking to public-private 
partnerships to expand the delivery of civic services.164 
																																																																																																																												
amendment has not been implemented, but “JnNURM tries to reignite the 
decentralization process.” Id. 
 157. JNNURM IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 9, at 2 (emphasizing that states 
have struggled to implement many of the provisions of the 74th CAA, that 
ULBs have not been properly transferred revenue sources, and that their 
autonomy is undermined with state approvals for tax rates, user charges, and 
new taxes). 
 158. Id. at 3. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id.; see also INDIA CONST. art. 243S, amended by The Constitution 
(Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act, Part IX-A, 1993. 
 162. JNNURM IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 9, at 4. With respect to struc-
tural innovations, the MML includes provisions to develop the State Election 
Commission for holding regular local elections, the State Finance Commis-
sion to aid local governments in revenue generation, and the District Plan-
ning Committees and Metropolitan Planning Committees to provide a re-
gional framework for ward committees. Id. 
 163. Id. at 4. 
 164. Id. When considering the earlier discussion of how public-private part-
nerships have undermined local authority, this proposal may actually be in 
tension with the 74th CAA’s decentralization agenda. Harriss, supra note 7, 
at 7–8. 
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JnNURM sets out a series of steps for states and urban mu-
nicipalities to put the reforms embodied in the MML into prac-
tice.165 State-level steps include a review of existing municipal 
acts in light of the MML’s language, definitive timelines for leg-
islative action, and a state agenda that allows municipalities to 
function as institutions of self-government, with the devolution 
of substantive areas listed in the Twelfth Schedule and the del-
egation of financial powers.166 In addition, at the municipal lev-
el, local governments are to clearly delineate the boundaries of 
wards, constitute ward committees where the legal authority 
exists, and create other governance structures to concentrate 
on particular substantive areas (e.g., the financing of municipal 
services).167 
To encourage states to advance the decentralization agenda, 
JnNURM conditioned central government funding for desig-
nated urban development projects on the successful implemen-
tation of the 74th CAA.168 For example, if a state government 
sought funding under JnNURM for municipal solid waste 
management upgrades (a JnNURM-eligible project), the state 
would first have to show that they had enacted so-called “man-
datory reforms” pursuant to the 74th CAA.169 However, these 
mandatory reforms are as open-ended as the language calling 
for decentralization under the 74th CAA.170 When describing 
the 74th CAA compliance requirement for funding, JnNURM 
uses ambiguous terms, such as “meaningful association and 
engagement of ULBs in planning functions” and demonstration 
of “implementation of decentralization measures as envisaged 
in the 74th CAA,” rather than conditioning funding on the 
more concrete decentralization steps mapped out in the 
																																																																																																																												
 165. Harriss, supra note 7, at 4–5. 
 166. Id. at 5. The state-level reforms also called upon state governments to 
prepare plans for social justice and economic development, yet it is left un-
clear if or how those planning efforts would include local governments at the 
outset. Id. 
 167. Id. at 5. 
 168. JNNURM OVERVIEW, supra note 3, at 12. 
 169. Id. Other projects eligible for JnNURM assistance include waste man-
agement, storm-water management, urban transportation, water protection, 
soil erosion prevention, and urban renewal—an umbrella term for the rede-
velopment of aging city areas, including such projects as the widening of nar-
row streets, the movement of industrial areas outside the central city, traffic-
reduction measures, sewage and solid-waste disposal upgrades, etc. Id. at 10. 
 170. Id. at 12. 
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MML.171 Moreover, there is little documentation on the extent 
to which JnNURM has furthered compliance with the 74th 
CAA.172 
JnNURM is a guidelines-based regime with an incentive 
structure in place to foster reforms consistent with the MML.173 
But what is absent from JnNURM is any suggestion of consti-
tutional reform to remove the discretion from states to choose 
whether such legislation should be enacted. To the contrary, 
the ministry characterizes state municipal laws as required 
under the 74th CAA.174 Yet the actual language of the 74th 
CAA makes state delegations through municipal acts permis-
sive, leaving a clear opening for states to turn their backs on 
the decentralization agenda.175 
III. RAJIV AWAS YOJANA AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE 74TH 
CAA 
A. Core Objectives of Rajiv Awas Yojana’s Slum Redevelopment 
Program 
The central government announced Rajiv Awas Yojana on 
June 4, 2009; a program designed to encourage partnerships 
with state and local governments to achieve a “slum-free In-
dia.”176 Administered by the Indian Ministry of Housing and 
																																																																																																																												
 171. Id. 
 172. The NIUA released a report in 2007 on compliance with the 74th CAA, 
however that report merely restated data from October 2004. See MATHUR, 
supra note 84. 
 173. JNNURM IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 9, at 3. (“The MML serves as an 
illustrative example of how state governments can orchestrate their legal 
framework guided by their own choices.”). 
 174. Id. at 2. The JnNURM primer specifically states that the 74th CAA 
“requires the state governments to amend their municipal laws in order to 
empower ULBs ‘with such power and authority as may be necessary to ena-
ble them to function as institutions of self governance.’” Id. 
 175. INDIA CONST. art. 243W, amended by The Constitution (Seventy-Fourth 
Amendment) Act, Part IX-A, 1993. However, the ministry’s characterization 
of the 74th CAA runs counter to the constitutional text, which states that 
“the Legislature of a State, may, by law, endow—(a) the Municipalities with 
such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to functions 
as institutions of self government.” Id. (emphasis added); see JNNURM 
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 9, at 3. 
 176. RAY GUIDELINES ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, supra note 5; see Aarti 
Dhar, Expert Panel on Rajiv Awas Yojana Formed, HINDU (Mar. 10, 2010), 
available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article223584.ece. In 
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Urban Poverty Alleviation, RAY embodies many of the values 
of local involvement initially set forth in JnNURM.177 At a high 
level, RAY is intended to bring slums178 within India’s formal 
governance structures to create parity in terms of urban amen-
ities and tackle some of the underlying structural causes of 
slums, like the dearth of suitable affordable housing for the ur-
ban poor.179 RAY sets out a mix of curative strategies to up-
grade or eradicate existing slums and preventative strategies 
to limit new slum development in urban areas.180 RAY’s pro-
grammatic scheme is divided into two phases.181 In the first 
phase of RAY, which runs from 2011 to 2013, the central gov-
ernment planned to dedicate Rs. 5,000 crore (or roughly one 
billion U.S. dollars) for the creation of slum-free city plans and 
																																																																																																																												
March 2010, Rs. 60 core were released to twenty states to begin their slum-
free city plans. MINISTRY OF HOUS. & URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION, STATUS 
NOTE ON RAJIV AWAS YOJANA (Mar. 2010) (India), available at 
http://mhupa.gov.in/W_new/NOTE_RAJIV_AWAS_YOJANA.pdf. 
 177. RAY GUIDELINES ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, supra note 5, at 3 
(finding that an inclusionary approach promotes efficiency with respect to 
implementation). 
 178. The term “slum” is often used loosely to refer to a variety of informal 
housing conditions. Adam Auerbach, Clients and Communities: The Political 
Economy of Party Network Expansion and Development in India’s Urban 
Slums 17 (Aug. 2012) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). The 
U.N. Habitat defined a slum as a 
mainly uncontrolled low-income residential area with an ambiguous 
legal status regarding land occupation; they are to a large extent 
built by the inhabitants themselves using their own means and are 
usually poorly equipped with public utilities and community services 
. . . they proliferated with the rapid growth of cities in the less devel-
oped countries after the Second World War. 
Id. (quoting UNITED NATIONS CTR. FOR HUMAN SETTLEMENTS, SURVEY OF SLUM 
AND SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS (1982)). In the 1970s, India experienced a surge 
in slums as farm workers, looking for more industrial jobs, relocated to cities. 
Id. These workers were often squatters and never secured property rights. Id. 
This is unsurprising given the types of lands where slums are developed, in-
cluding “unused government land, hazardous sites unfit for sanctioned urban 
development, or private lands under ambiguous ownership.” Id. at 18. Slum 
dwellers find these sites attractive for slum development, as eviction in the 
near term is unlikely when there are no immediate development plans for the 
land. Id. 
 179. SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 13, at 1. 
 180. Id. at 2. 
 181. EUROINDIA CTR., RAJIV ASAS YOJANA 1 (July 2011). 
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the execution of pilot slum redevelopment projects.182 The first 
pilot projects were to be funded in cities where central govern-
ment spending was most likely to be cross-subsidized through 
state and local funding and public-private partnerships.183 The 
second phase of the program runs from 2013 to 2022, which is 
when the redevelopment projects are to be implemented pursu-
ant to the state slum-free city plans.184 
RAY requires that participating states create Slum Free City 
Plans of Action (“POA”), which map out state and local curative 
and preventative measures for slums.185 The central govern-
ment has articulated a set of core values for these POAs.186 
Many of these core values relate to the land tenure rights of 
slum dwellers and local participation in slum redevelopment 
plans.187 Yet the challenge with these POAs is that they are not 
legally enforceable documents.188 As such, POAs may comport 
with RAY’s guidelines on paper, but states may choose not to 
recognize or fully engage local governments when carrying out 
redevelopment projects in slum areas. 
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of RAY is the require-
ment that states extend formal property rights to slum dwell-
ers in order to receive any central government redevelopment 
funding.189 Thus, before any RAY project is approved, a state 
																																																																																																																												
 182. See Moushumi Das Gupta, Bill on Property Rights to Slum Dwellers in 
the Works, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Oct. 30, 2012), 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/Bill-on-property-
rights-to-slumdwellers-in-the-works/Article1-952380.aspx. 
 183. MINISTRY OF HOUS. & URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION, RAJIV AWAS 
YOJANA: GUIDELINES FOR SLUM-FREE CITY PLANNING 2 (2012) (India) [hereinaf-
ter GUIDELINES FOR SLUM-FREE CITY PLANNING] (presenting the criteria for 
the selection of cities, noting that preference will be given to those that can 
maximize cross-subsidization through public-private partnerships); see also 
EUROINDIA CTR., supra note 181, at 2. The central government provides 50% 
“of slum redevelopment costs, including provision of basic civic [and] social 
infrastructure and housing including ownership, rental and transit.” Id. 
 184. CCEA Nod for Slum-Free India Scheme, YAHOO! NEWS MAKTOOB (Sept. 
3, 2013), available at http://en-maktoob.news.yahoo.com/ccea-nod-slum-free-
india-scheme-180215502.html. 
 185. SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 13, at 2. 
 186. Id. at 1. 
 187. Id.; see also RAY GUIDELINES ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, supra note 
5, at 3. 
 188. SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 13, at 2. 
 189. GUIDELINES FOR SLUM-FREE CITY PLANNING, supra note 183, at 1 (Cen-
tral government aid under RAY was conditioned on “[s]tates assign[ing] legal 
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will need to submit a detailed description of the slum-
redevelopment site under review, a POA, and a state bill that 
formally assigns property rights to slum dwellers.190 Notably, 
this bill does not need to be passed to receive funding for a 
RAY-sponsored redevelopment program, but the State Cabi-
nets must approve the bill, and the State Assembly must pro-
vide the session when the bill will be voted on.191 
The central government also described two companion pre-
sumptions to guide the slum-free cities process: a preference for 
slum-upgrades and for no evictions.192 Beginning with slum 
upgrades, the central government has stated that state and lo-
cal governments should first look to whether conditions can be 
improved within urban slums before considering any slum-
resettlement options.193 Upgrades are classified into a number 
of different categories based on the level of capital investment 
that is required.194 For instance, a “slum improvement” is the 
least capital intensive, involving infrastructure investments in 
areas where slum dwellers have constructed incremental hous-
ing.195 A “slum upgradation” is more capital intensive, involv-
ing both infrastructure and housing unit upgrades to provide a 
sufficient base of incremental housing.196 And “slum redevel-
opment” is the most capital intensive, involving full clearance 
of the slums on site and redevelopment of low-cost housing for 
slum dwellers on that same site.197 The central government has 
expressed that these options are preferred to “slum resettle-
ment,” where slums are cleared and slum dwellers are relocat-
																																																																																																																												
title to slum-dwellers over their dwelling space.”). In order to house displaced 
slum dwellers, the central government requires that of the new housing de-
veloped in slum areas, 25% should be reserved for the urban poor. Id. An al-
ternative requirement of 35% of dwelling units may apply in urban areas 
where the economies are particularly weak. 
 190. Id. at 2–3. 
 191. Id. 
 192. SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 13; see also GUIDELINES 
FOR SLUM FREE CITY PLANNING, supra note 182, at 2 (describing the whole-
city approach to slum redevelopment as an “integrated and holistic plan pre-
pared for the upgradation of all existing slums, notified or non-notified, in 
each identified city”). 
 193. SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 13, at 2. 
 194. Id. at 16. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
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ed to alternative sites.198 Instead, this option should be re-
served for “untenable slums,” where upgrades or redevelop-
ment on the site in question is either not possible or practica-
ble.199 
If slum resettlement is deemed necessary,200 the central gov-
ernment has advised that alternative housing for slum dwell-
ers should be identified in either the same ward or a nearby 
ward to minimize the level of disruption and retain important 
community assets.201 Similarly, in the event that eviction is 
unavoidable, the central government’s guidelines call upon lo-
cal governments to consult with the urban poor to identify al-
ternative locations for housing.202 Indeed, the slum-
redevelopment process is supposed to be driven by the smallest 
unit of political representation, the ward committee.203 The 
hope is that engagement at the ward committee level will help 
align redevelopment priorities with the needs of slum-
dwellers.204 
B. RAY’s Jurisdictional Design 
The central government provided recommendations for RAY’s 
general administrative arrangements, which are intended to 
foster community participation.205 A state-level “nodal agency” 
is tasked with program design and oversight responsibilities, 
which can be divided into the following three categories: insti-
tutional, financial, and planning.206 Institutional responsibili-
ties include establishing statewide slum and household defini-
tions, setting criteria for the prioritization of slums, and devel-
oping eligibility criteria for property entitlements for slum-
dwellers.207 Financial responsibilities include setting external 
																																																																																																																												
 198. Id. at 2. 
 199. Id. at 16. 
 200. Id. at 9. One situation the central government discussed is the identifi-
cation of slums located on environmentally hazardous sites. Id. 
 201. Id. at 2. 
 202. Id. at 1. 
 203. Id. at 2. Planning at the ward committee level is thought to “ensure 
that slum dwellers within a ward or zone continue to live in the same area, 
which would promote heterogeneous neighborhoods as well as continuation of 
residence-livelihood linkages.” Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. RAY GUIDELINES ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, supra note 5, at 4. 
 206. SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 13, at 2. 
 207. Id. 
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development charges and subsidies for infrastructure develop-
ment.208 And planning responsibilities involve monitoring the 
local collection of data and ensuring the involvement of ward 
committees in that process.209 The state agency administering 
RAY is supported by a state-level RAY cell, which is a commit-
tee of experts outside of government that serve as advisors to 
the state agency.210 
At the local level, ULBs are responsible for program imple-
mentation.211 Implementation includes slum-level mapping, 
door-to-door surveying of slums, designing and implementing 
slum redevelopment plans, and program monitoring.212 The 
central government contemplates that local administration can 
take a variety of forms.213 Under one conception, the ULB re-
tains full control of community surveying through an active 
Urban Poverty Alleviation Cell that lends local knowledge and 
technical expertise.214 Alternatively, the ULB can contract out 
surveying to nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) and 
community-based organizations (“CBOs”) with technical exper-
tise and on-the-ground knowledge.215 
One salient feature of RAY is the significant amount of local 
government capacity the program requires.216 If one were to 
look just at the slum-level mapping function, the requisite level 
of technical capacity becomes readily apparent. ULBs must 
prepare a list of known slums, identify slum boundaries, identi-
fy vacant land for resettlement purposes, and then roughly 
map the actual slums, including households, schools, health 
care centers, community work spaces, commercial activities, 
community halls, night shelter, etc.217 Once slums are mapped, 
the ULBs begin a process of household counting, working with 
either a selected agency or an NGO to engage community lead-
ers within the slum.218 Community volunteers are assigned to 
																																																																																																																												
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. RAY GUIDELINES ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, supra note 5, at 4. 
 211. SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 13, at 2. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. RAY GUIDELINES ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, supra note 5, at 5. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 9. 
 218. Id.  
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give each house a unique number and to canvass to ensure that 
“every family living in the slum is included in the survey.”219 
Looking closely at these various steps is a sure indication that 
strong local governance structures are needed to implement 
RAY’s programmatic mandates, which have the potential to 
displace some of India’s most vulnerable citizens in the name of 
redevelopment.220 
Where redevelopment through RAY has occurred, there is 
some evidence that the quality of new housing built for low-
income families using RAY funds is subpar.221 In fact, the cen-
tral government is now considering third-party inspections for 
low-income housing developed under the program to address 
these quality concerns.222 Thus, even where slums are properly 
identified, and new housing for slum dwellers is constructed, 
there is still a continuous need for local representation to make 
sure that new low-income housing is built to last. 
C. Limited Redevelopment Progress under RAY Tied to the 
Property Rights Scheme 
Nearly all states and union territories have received funding 
for slum-free city planning under RAY.223 Yet only a fraction of 
those states have adopted legislation that would confer full 
property rights to slum dwellers, which effectively precludes 
RAY funding for the physical redevelopment of slums.224 In 
fact, of the Rs. 5000 crore allocated for Phase 1, only Rs. 100 
crore had been spent as of October 2012 (which is nearly the 
end of Phase 1).225 While states have drafted POAs, very few 
have come forward with specific slum development projects.226 
																																																																																																																												
 219. Id.  
 220. Id. 
 221. See Third Party Inspections of Rajiv Awas Yojana Units Soon: Maken, 
ZEENEWS (Dec. 4, 2012), http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/third-party-
inspection-of-rajiv-awas-yojana-units-soon-maken_814580.html. 
 222. Id. 
 223. See MINISTRY OF HOUS. & URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION, ALLOCATION 
FOR URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION SCHEMES (2011) (India), available at 
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=75948 (describing the fund-
ing that was released for “undertaking preparatory activities in 157 cities 
across 34 states and union territories under the Slum Free City Planning 
Scheme, the preparatory phase of RAY”). 
 224. Gupta, supra note 182. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
2014] SLUM-FREE CITIES PROGRAM 949 
This is likely due to the “lukewarm” response that states have 
had to the property rights requirement for slum-dwellers.227 
Based on the reluctance of state governments to enact prop-
erty rights legislation for slum dwellers, the central govern-
ment’s Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation un-
veiled revisions to model property rights legislation.228 The re-
vised bill removed the requirement that slum dwellers receive 
permanent ownership rights to a dwelling place, and replaced 
it with a provision requiring that states confer leases to slum 
dwellers for a minimum of fifteen years.229 The bill retains the 
presumption toward slum-upgrades, providing that unless 
there is an extreme case, the property entitlements should be 
designed to keep slum dwellers in the same area.230 The revised 
bill also addresses the problem of encroachment on public 
lands, leading to new slum development.231 To deter the crea-
tion of new slums, the model bill provides for a system of mone-
tary penalties and even jail time of up to three years for those 
that construct illegal structures on public lands.232 
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES TO RAY AND DECENTRALIZATION 
REFORMS TO PROTECT SLUM DWELLERS 
Contention over key features of the RAY program, like the 
Property Rights to Slum Dwellers model bill, suggests that 
																																																																																																																												
 227. Id. Several policy groups have questioned and critiqued the workabil-
ity of providing tenure security to slum dwellers. See PATRICIA CLARKE ANNEZ 
ET AL., AHMEDABAD, MORE BUT DIFFERENT GOVERNMENT FOR “SLUM FREE” AND 
LIVABLE CITIES (World Bank Sustainable Dev. Network, Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 6267, 2012). 
 228. See Gupta, supra note 182. 
 229. Id. Commentators have indicated that even under the revised bill, the 
transfer of property rights is bankable, meaning slum dwellers could use 
their entitlements as collateral for a mortgage from banks to build new 
homes. Id. 
 230. See Mahendra Kumar Singh, Slum-Dwellers Will Be Given Property 
Right: Maken, TIMES OF INDIA (Oct. 31, 2012), 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-10-
31/india/34836089_1_slum-dwellers-property-rights-ajay-maken. When an-
nouncing the revised model bill, the new minister for Housing and Urban 
Poverty Alleviation stated, “[W]e plan to rehabilitate those living in slums in 
the vicinity of a five km radius where in situ rehabilitation is not possible,” 
adding that “shifting the poor away from their source of livelihood would not 
solve the problem.” Id. 
 231. Gupta, supra note 182. 
 232. Id. 
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there is not yet consensus among state and local actors on how 
to pursue redevelopment in a fashion that is adequately protec-
tive of slum dwellers.233 The jurisdictional conflict over land 
tenure provisions is not surprising in light of the current state 
of compliance with the 74th CAA, which is far from achieved.234 
The notion that RAY’s slum-free cities program can incorporate 
local voices at a time when ward committees are nonexistent or 
barely functional is cause for concern. A program design that 
calls upon local governments to identify slum areas and take 
stock of families that will potentially get displaced in redevel-
opment requires a strong forum for local participation. 
As such, central government actors should consider delaying 
RAY until the decentralization reforms, such as those tied to 
JnNURM, have taken shape. This delay has occurred in prac-
tice as a result of reluctance on the part of states to grant per-
manent protections to slum-dwellers. What is recommended, 
however, is that the central government deliberately delay any 
capital project that involves slum clearance until states have 
achieved full compliance with both the letter and spirit of the 
74th CAA. 
To aid states and local governments on the path to decentral-
ization, the central government should revisit the language of 
the 74th CAA to remove the permissive terms around state leg-
islative enactments and provide definitive legal authority for 
local governments to assume substantive planning and urban 
redevelopment functions. Similarly, the text of JnNURM 
should be revisited to tie central government funding to con-
crete steps toward decentralization, like state municipal acts 
that delegate Twelfth Schedule duties to local bodies, or the 
constitution of ward committees. 
A. Advancement of Decentralization Reforms 
Examinations of RAY rarely address limitations in local gov-
ernment capacity. India’s local governance structures, particu-
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 234. See supra text accompanying notes 140–153. 
2014] SLUM-FREE CITIES PROGRAM 951 
larly the ward committees, are still relatively weak, which 
makes genuine local participation a challenge.235 To move for-
ward under the current local governance framework would un-
dermine the spirit of RAY’s programmatic mandates and inhib-
it the full protection of slum dwellers that is sought under the 
program. 
As redevelopment progresses with the support of RAY funds, 
the central government should consider how to advance decen-
tralization reforms, as it did under JnNURM, to bolster local 
government participation and capacity. One way to support de-
centralization is to revisit the language of the 74th CAA and 
remove the permissive terms regarding the enactment of state 
municipal acts. The Constitution should firmly require that 
states adopt legislation to delegate the substantive duties in 
the Twelfth Schedule to ULBs, and grant ULBs the power to 
levy taxes and generate other forms of local revenue so they 
can more effectively provide urban public goods. 
As was discussed when looking at NIUA’s findings on compli-
ance with the 74th CAA, legislation is just one step in the pro-
cess toward genuine delegation of power to local governance 
structures. Central government review of state delegations and 
the constitution of ward committees will foster compliance with 
the terms of the 74th CAA. Yet without legislative enactments, 
jurisdictional conflicts are difficult to resolve and usually result 
in undermining local authority.236 In addition to constitutional 
reforms, adjustments should be made to the JnNURM program 
to create clear benchmarks for decentralization, which states 
and territories must satisfy before receiving any funding under 
JnNURM. 
B. Programmatic Reforms under RAY 
In light of the revised bill on property rights to slum dwellers 
announced in late 2012,237 there is reason to be concerned 
about the rights of slum dwellers as redevelopment programs 
move forward under RAY. The property rights scheme was al-
tered markedly, from a program of ownership rights for slum 
dwellers, to a program requiring only long-term leases.238 And 
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while this significant revision may have been necessary to in-
duce states to move forward with slum-redevelopment under 
RAY, new central government interventions are now necessary 
to compensate for the erosion of these tenure security provi-
sions.239 
For instance, the central government should consider (1) bar-
ring any RAY funding until certain structural changes are 
made at the state level to protect slum dwellers, and (2) mak-
ing the detailed commitments in state-level POAs legally en-
forceable. Conditioning funding on structural commitments is 
low-hanging fruit in terms of programmatic reforms for RAY. A 
relatively simple mechanism to ensure that states follow 
through on protections to slum dwellers is to condition devel-
opment funding on the passage of property rights legislation, 
rather than the mere drafting and tentative approval by state 
legislative bodies. The same should be true for ward commit-
tees—if ward committees are not fully constituted in the par-
ticular location where slum redevelopment is proposed, central 
government funding should not be provided under RAY. 
A separate reform to the property rights scheme relates to 
the criminalization of slum dwellers in areas where RAY POAs 
are in place. As discussed above, the new MML provides that 
those who encroach on government land are subject to up to 
three years of jail time, fines, or some combination of the 
two.240 This is seemingly inconsistent with RAY’s core objec-
tives, which were expressly designed to consider both curative 
and preventative strategies.241 A blanket state legislative en-
actment that criminalizes vulnerable slum dwellers encroach-
ing on public land may not be appropriate in all cases. A more 
nuanced approach to handling the encroachment on public 
lands, with an assessment of where social services and proper-
ty entitlements can help to eradicate the slum in question, is 
therefore advised. 
In terms of the enforceability of commitments made in state-
level POAs, the central government should look at claw-back 
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provisions to retract state funding where commitments in the 
POA are not realized. Additionally, RAY places a strong em-
phasis on public-private partnerships to foster slum redevel-
opment.242 Yet, without proper safeguards, these partnerships 
may erode the property rights afforded to slum dwellers, and 
lead to unnecessary relocation of poor residents. A particular 
focus should therefore be on local participation where public-
private partnerships are involved, as historically, this has been 
an area where local voices have been restrained.243 
Until these reforms are adopted and there exists clear con-
sensus on protections for urban slum dwellers, the central gov-
ernment should place Phase II of RAY on hold. Moving forward 
with capital-intensive slum-clearance projects without a full 
understanding of the needs of potentially displaced slum dwell-
ers runs the risk of destabilizing the most vulnerable segments 
of India’s urban poor, and merely shifts the problem of slum 
development from one locale to another. Ironically, capital out-
lays for slum-redevelopment have already seen delays, but 
those delays stem from conflicts over ratcheting down the pro-
tections for slum dwellers rather than ratcheting them up. This 
is particularly worrisome as slum-redevelopment plans are 
likely to be significantly disruptive for the urban poor. 
CONCLUSION 
While many critiques of RAY focus on the defects with the ex-
isting programmatic structure, there is a strong link between 
the weak implementation of some of the 74th CAA’s core provi-
sions, like the establishment of ward committees, and the pri-
mary concerns surrounding the adequate protection of slum 
dwellers under RAY. Although RAY’s jurisdictional design is 
consistent with its programmatic objectives, constitutional re-
form is warranted to advance a decentralization agenda that 
will bolster local governance structures. 
Without strong local governments, there is concern that slum 
dwellers will not receive adequate procedural and substantive 
protections as slum-clearance projects proceed. This concern is 
heightened as RAY moves from a program that had offered 
permanent property entitlements to slum dwellers, to one 
where only fifteen-year leases are required. As such, removing 
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permissive language from the 74th CAA to require state en-
actments supporting both the functional devolution of substan-
tive powers to local governments and local revenue generating 
authority would be an important step forward in protecting the 
rights of traditionally disenfranchised slum dwellers. 
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